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ABSTRACT 
In  this  paper  we  analyse  the  effects  of  microfinance  programs  upon 
household welfare in Vietnam.  Our analytical framework builds upon the 
rural household models of Singh et al. (1986) and Rosenzweig (1990).  Data 
on  470  households  across  25  villages  was  collected  using  a  quasi-
experiment  survey  approach  to  overcome  self-selection  bias.    In  our 
econometric analysis the welfare effects of microfinance are proxied using 
measures  of  household  income  and  consumption.    The  empirical  results 
indicate  that  participation  in  microfinance  has  a  positive  effect  upon 
household welfare, with the size of the effect increasing at a decreasing rate 
as a household spends more time in the microfinance program. 
 
Keywords:   Microfinance, rural households, Vietnam, quasi-experiment survey, 
effectiveness, welfare.   1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Microfinance refers to the provision of financial services to the poor. In the 
last thirty years, it has emerged from a grassroots movement to a global industry with 
about 70 million clients in 40 countries (Harris, 2005). In Vietnam, microfinance is also 
an important component of poverty reduction programs despite this it only started in the 
mid 1990s after the launch of the economics renovation policy. Improving the efficiency 
and effectiveness is the main challenge of microfinance in order to serve more clients on 
a  sustainable  basis.  This  has  motivated  us  to  conduct  a  study  on  the  efficiency  and 
effectiveness of the microfinance sector in Vietnam. The main objective of this research 
project is to provide policy applications and to improve the contribution of microfinance 
to poverty reduction. The efficiency analysis is conducted using the production frontier 
approach  with  data  collected  from  the  survey  of  microfinance  programs.  The  result 
revealed that the main source of inefficiency of microfinance programs was due to their 
small operation scale. In order to be able to further develop for this sector, it is necessary 
to analyse the effectiveness of microfinance in poverty reduction. 
This paper, which is a part of the above-mentioned research project, examines 
the  effects  of  microfinance  services  on  welfare  of  member  households  using 
econometrics techniques with the data collected from a quasi-experimental survey at the 
household level. The objective of such a survey design is to control for the self-selection 
issue. Our results revealed that access to microfinance created positive effects on the 
income and consumption level of its clients but this relationship was not statistically 
significant. In addition, the marginal effect of microfinance decreased over time. The 
paper  includes  five  sections.  After  this  introductory  section,  Section  2  discusses  an 
analytical framework of household production and the main channel that microfinance 
can create effects to household welfare. Section 3 describes the sampling design of the 
household survey, choice of variables and descriptive statistics. Results and discussions 
from econometrics estimates are presented in Section 4, while some concluding remarks 
made in Section 5. 
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2.  THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This section presents a model that can be used to illustrate the relationship 
between  access  to  microfinance  and  household  welfare.  The  model  includes  a 
presentation on main components of a representative household and the main channels in 
which microfinance may affect key household economics indicators, such as income and 
consumption.  The  model  is  based  on  the  general  model  of    Singh  et  al.  (1986), 
Rosenzweig  (1990)  and  Taylor  and  Adelman  (2003),    while  the  effects  of  financial 
services  on  household  economic  wellbeing  are  based  primarily  on  the  models  of 
Maldonado (2004) and McKernan (2002).  
 
2.1  HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND UTILITY FUNCTIONS 
In agricultural household models, households play the roles of both producers 
(represent  by  a  production  function)  and  consumers  (represent  by  a  utility  function), 
hence, effects of any intervention such as microfinance services, need to be examined 
through both these functions.  
2.1.1  Production function 
Let us consider a rural household that acts as both producer and consumer 
while  remaining  in  contact  with  the  outside  economy  by  purchasing  inputs,  labour, 
capital;  and  selling  outputs,  services,  labour  and  deposit  savings.  The  production 
activities of the household at period t are conducted by using labour (Lt), capital (Kt), 
land (Nt), and other inputs including purchased and home inputs (Xt), to produce output 
(Qt). All components of the household production can be affected by exogenous shocks et 
(e.g.,  weather,  pests),  which  are  assumed  to  have  a  normal  distribution  and  affect 
household production multiplicatively.  
( , , , : ) ( , , , ) t t t t t t t t t t t Q f L K N X f L K N X e e = =                      (1) 
Although in rural Vietnam most households primarily use home labour, the 
labour market is normal and the use of hired labour is possible. The production function   3 
(1) allows the transition of hired labour (Lht) into the family production activities, and 
family labour into the local labour market during the off-season period.
1 The stock of 
family labour (proxied by workable hours of all labour in the family) may be influenced 
by some quality factors, such as health status (i.e., physical fitness, human capital, and 
social capital).
2 For example, households having good health and a skilled labour force 
are  likely  to  have  higher  productivity.  Likewise,  households  with  well-connected 
networks of social relations (e.g., friends, clubs, and organisations) may have a chance to 
improve  production  through  better  information  and  other  privileges  shared  among 
network members. The family labour stock (Lft) includes time spent on production within 
the household (LQt), time spent on waged employment outside the household (Lwt), time 
for housework (Lzt),
3 and leisure time (Llt). 
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The capital stock used in production may be divided into financial capital and 
physical  capital.  The  physical  capital  stock  is  a  function  of  the  existing  stock 
(depreciated) plus the value of investment in the past period. Therefore, the equation for 
physical capital stock is presented in (3), where d is the depreciation rate and It is the 
investment level in period t. 
1 (1 ) t t t K K I d + = - +     (3) 
The financial capital of household includes cash in hand, savings and funds 
mobilised from external sources. With the availability of special financial services such 
as  NGO  microfinance  programs  (NMPs),  eligible  households  may  decide  to  join  the 
program and demand an amount Bt to invest on indivisible projects.
4 The financial capital 
                                                 
1 It is assumed that household and hired labour is perfectly substitutable, and hence, the same wage rate 
(wt) is applied for labour in this model. 
2 These factors also affect hired labour but the household has no control over them. 
3 The amount of housework is expected to be related to some indicators of family composition, such as 
dependency ratio (i.e., households with more dependents would need more time for housework). 
4The demand for funds includes external credit and internal mobilisation by changes in physical assets 
(e.g., sales of livestock, land), financial assets (e.g., withdrawal of savings), and hence, it partly reflects the 
livelihood strategy of rural households. However, evidence of exchanging physical capital and durables for   4 
stock  of  households  can  include  endowments,  borrowed  funds,  savings  and  retained 
earnings.  Therefore,  the  evolution  of  household  financial  capital  stock  (Ft)  can  be 
represented in equation (4),  where rt is the interest rate of financial stock from period t to 
period  t+1;  Pt  is  the  profit,  Et  is  the  endowment,  Rt  is  the  remittance,  Ct  is  the 
consumption, and It is the investment in period t. 
1 (1 ) t t t t t t t t t F r F E R B C I + = + +Õ + + + - -   (4) 
The profit of households is measured as the total revenue minus total costs.  
The total revenue  consist of the revenues from production (i.e., the product of home 
output, Qt, and its price, PQt); income from waged labour (i.e., the product of wage rate, 
wt, and outside work hours, Lwt); and the earnings from savings and/or other financial 
assets (i.e., provided by the product of saving interest rate, rSt, and the saving volume, St). 
Total costs include spending on hired labour (i.e., the product of wage rate, wt, and hired 
labour, Lht); purchased inputs (i.e., a product of the input set, Xt, and its price, PXt); the 
rent and/or tax on production land (i.e., a product of land rental rate, at, and the area of 
net  land  exchange  Nnt);
5  and  the  cost  of  loans  and/or  other  financial  liabilities  (i.e., 
proxied by the product of the loan interest rate rBt and the loan volume Bt).  
( ) ( )
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The market for productive land in Vietnam, where land is state owned, is still 
imperfect. The government assigns production land to households equally according to 
the size of households giving a  Land-used Certificate (LUC), allowing households to 
have the right to that land for a particular period, such as 30-50 years. Households can 
rent or transfer the LUC only if they move to other areas, change occupation, or lack 
production ability, but there is no mention about the sale of land (The Government of 
                                                                                                                                                 
funds is rare in this study. Hence, in this model the demand for funds includes external credit only. For 
more details about demand for funds, see for example, Iqbal (2004). 
5 For simplicity, assume that rate for the rented-in and rented-out of land is the same, at at. The net land 
exchange is equal to the area allocated to households (Nat) minus any land rent out (Nrot) plus any land rent 
in (Nrit), in other word Nnt=Nat-Nrot-Nrit. When both land rented-in and land rented-out are present in a 
household, it is likely that household may swap land to make it more convenience for their production.    5 
Vietnam, 1998). Therefore, land transactions are introduced in this model in the form of 
land rent-in and rent-out, although this may not be a common practice in rural Vietnam. 
The  input  set  of this model  (Xt)  is  the  combination  of  home  inputs  (e.g., 
manure and seeds) and purchased inputs (e.g., fertilizer and hybrid seeds). Traditionally, 
agricultural production does not need much in the way of purchased inputs, but with the 
development  of  new  technologies,  new  inputs  giving  higher  productivity  became 
available, leading to same households making a switch from traditional inputs. Thus, the 
proportion  of  purchased  inputs  over  home  inputs  can  be  used  as  a  proxy  for  the 
production technology adopted by households.  
The components of the production function (i.e., physical, financial, social 
and human capital) in a household are transferable during the production process. For 
example, the relative sizes of physical capital and financial capital can be determined by 
decisions such as liquidising physical capital into financial (e.g., selling machinery and 
livestock) or the accumulation of physical assets from financial assets (e.g., purchasing 
new equipment). Likewise, financial and physical capital can have a relationship with 
human capital through the consumption of food, education and health care services. For 
example, borrowers may invest a proportion of borrowed funds for production and use 
any  remaining  part  to  cover  shortfalls  in  food  consumption,  which  can  result  in  the 
necessary level of nutrition needed for a productive labour force. The dynamics among 
these  components  may  depend  on  factors  such  as  the  size  and  timeframe  of  the 
investment,  household  characteristics  (e.g.,  demographical  factors  of  household  heads 
and other labourers in the household, number of dependents) and other unobservable 
characteristics of the household, such as risk attitude and entrepreneurial skills. We can 
describe  the  way  in  which  households  make  decisions  on  optimal  ways  to  develop 
physical capital, financial capital, social capital, and human capital and using a utility 
function, such as that described below. 
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2.1.2  Utility function 
We  assume  that  the  main  goal  of  households  is  to  maximise  the  level  of 
utility,  resulting  from  the  consumption  (Ct)  of  home  produced  goods  (Qht),  market 
purchased goods (Qmt), and leisure (Llt). The consumption of goods and services, and the 
allocation of time for leisure are expected to be affected by a set of exogenous household 
characteristics qt (e.g., household size and dependency ratio).  For example, households 
with small children may not be interested in choosing long distance travel as a leisure 
activity. In the microfinance programs under this study, certain components of the vector, 
qt, such as gender and wealth status, were set as the eligibility criteria for membership. 
Assuming that the timeframe in which the household operates is from period 0 to period 
T, the life-time utility of a household is the total of present-value instantaneous utility 
with functional form ut in each period, discounted by a and the expectation Et conditional 
on the information available at time t, is presented in equation (6). 
0 0
(1 ) ( , ; ) (1 ) ( , , ; )
T T
t t
t t t lt t t t mt ht lt t
t t
U E C L E Q Q L a u q a u q
- -
= =
= + = + ∑ ∑             (6) 
The  level  of  consumption  is  decided  by  the  total  budget  available  for 
consumption.  Particularly,  the  budget  for  households  to  purchase  market  goods  and 
services and the value of leisure time
6 are determined by the marketed surplus
7, the value 
of the net labour exchange
8, the net value of land exchange (i.e., 
t t n a N ), endowment (Et), 
remittances (Rt) and borrowing (Bt), and the input costs (PxtXt).  
                   
t t t n t t t m m Q t nt t n t t t X t P Q P Q w L a N E R B P X = + + + + + -   (7) 
                                                 
6 The value of time spent on leisure and housework is based on the concept of labour income as the value of 
the household labour stock (2005). 
7 It is assumed that all products of households are tradable, and hence the marketed surplus is represented 
by  the  product  of  surplus  home  produce  (i.e.,  total  output  produced  minus  home  consumption 
nt t ht Q Q Q = - ) and the price of home output PQt 
8 The net labour exchange is represented by home labour spent in wage employment minus the hired labour 
working in family production (i.e.,  nt wt ht L L L = - ).   7 
The  household  aims  to  maximise  utility  by  choosing  the  appropriate 
combination  of  consumption  and  leisure  in  (6),  given  the  production  technology  in 
equation (1), the time constraint in equation (2) and the budget constraint in equation (7). 
These  latter  two  constraints  can  be  represented  by  evolution  equations  of  two  state 
variables, physical and financial capital stocks, presented in the following optimisation 
problem. 
                    t ( , , , , , , , )
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  (8) 
The notation Dt in the above problem, represents the set of decision choices 
of a household on production and consumption factors. Meanwhile, the first constraint 
reflects the evolution of physical capital stock in equation (3), the second constraint is 
obtained  by  inserting  equation  (5)  into  equation  (4),  representing  the  evolution  of 
financial capital. The third constraint is a common restriction that a household leaves 
physical  assets and  financial stock for the next generation no less than their positive 
endowments. Other factors only need a non-negative restriction, allowing them to move 
in  or  out  of  the  system  (e.g.,  households  may  decide  to  use  all  labour  into  waged 
employment or transfer all productive land to others).  
The value of the maximised utility from the above optimisation problem is 
represented by an indirect utility function Vt in equation (9), with Kt+1 and Ft+1 following 




( , ) { ( , , ; ) (1 ) ( , )}  
t t
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-
+ + + = + +       (9) 
The decisions regarding optimal levels of production variables (e.g., capital, 
labour, land, inputs) and consumption variables (e.g., goods and services, leisure) are   8 
solved by deriving the first order conditions of this indirect utility function with respect to 
the  variables  of  interest.  For  example,  the  optimal  loan  amount  is  solved  by 
differentiating equation (9) with respect to external loan as follows.
9  
1
1 1 ( ) (1 ) { ( )} 0 t t t t t V B E V F a
-
+ + ¢ ¢ = + =   (10) 
The  expression  presented  in  equation  (10)  shows  that  the  household  will 
borrow until the discounted marginal benefit of the loan is zero, or equivalently when the 
loan  interest  rate  equals  the  value  of  the  marginal  product  of  the  loan.  In  practice, 
households may not be able to obtain the optimal amount of loan funds due to credit 
rationing,
10 and hence, they equate the shadow price of loans (i.e., roughly equal to the 
loan  interest  rate  plus  transaction  costs  to  borrowers)  with  the  value  of  its  marginal 
product.  Regardless  of  equating  the  exogenous  loan  interest  rate  (or  the  endogenous 
shadow price) to the value of the marginal product of the loan, households select the loan 
size which allows them to get as close as possible to the optimal path. Therefore, the 
decision on optimal (or close to optimal) amount of loans will be depicted in a reduced-
form  function  of  market  prices  (for  both  consumption  and  production  variables)  and 
inputs as: 
* *( , , , , , , | ; )
t t t t t X m Q t t t t t t B B P P P L K N r q e =   (11) 
Substituting Bt
*
 into equations (1), (5), (7) and (6), we can see that there is a 
relationship between credit and household income and consumption. 
Using the first order conditions for decision variables, we obtain a system of 
equations  where  each  endogenous  decision  variable  is  a  function  of  all  exogenous 
variables (e.g., land, capital, prices), and hence, the household decisions can be solved 
                                                 
9 The choice of other decisions on production and consumption variables will be made similarly but this 
study focuses on analysing the decision on the demand for the financial input. 
10  In  this  study  rationing  refers  to  quantity-rationing  since  NMPs  set  the  limit  for  loan  size,  which 
progressively increases with the seniority of members. For other types of credit rationing, see, for example, 
Maldonado (2004).   9 




2.2  ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF MICROFINANCE 
As  mentioned  previously,  there  is  a  relationship  between  the  decisions 
regarding the financial inputs and various indicators of household economic wellbeing, 
such  as  income  and  consumption.  The  effects  of  microfinance,  therefore,  can  be 
estimated  by  comparing  the  outcomes  of  households  with  and  without  microfinance 
access, classified by the eligibility criteria qt





represent  the  indirect  utility  of  participating  and  non-participating  households, 
respectively. The effects of microfinance can be measured by comparing the outcomes of 
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The linkages and components of microfinance presented in the model above 
suggest that financial inputs (proxied by access to microfinance) can affect household 
economic wellbeing. Microfinance services can create effects on household economic 
indicators through four main channels, namely financial capital, physical capital, human 
capital and social capital. Other important determinants of household utility may include 




                                                 
11 Another approach to solving for the household decision variables involves using optimisation models 
(i.e., maximise household objective function subject to a set of constraints). For more details about options 
to solve rural household models, see for example, Kuiper (1990). 
12  It  is  possible  that  some  eligible  households  may  choose  not  to  participate  in  microfinance  but  the 
practical evidence among NMPs in this study indicated that very few households belong to this group.  
13 Fore more details discussions on the main pathways in which microfinance influences household welfare, 
see, for example, Marr (2002).   10 
3.  THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY AND DATA 
3.1  THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
The household survey in this study was conducted using a quasi-experimental 
approach, in which we sampled both eligible and ineligible groups of households from 
member villages and non-member villages that meet the selection criteria of microfinance 
programs. In order to make relevant control-treatment groups, villages and households 
were  selected  according  to  eligibility  criteria,  which  are  a  set  of  observable 
characteristics.  
The survey consists of two steps. In the first step we identified the pool of 
members  and  member-to-be  villages  by  asking  NMPs  that  planned  to  expand  their 
operations and have been in operation for at least three years. Therefore, the primary 
sampling units (PSUs) are villages with microfinance and those eligible but have not yet 
received microfinance services. In the second stage, we constructed lists of eligible and 
ineligible  households  (i.e.,  strata)  in  each  village,  then  households  were  sampled 
randomly from those lists (see Table 1). 
Table 1: The Sampling Frame for the Household Survey 
Villages that meet the selection criteria of microfinance programs 
(poor villages and lack of access to financial services) 
Have received microfinance services 
(Member or treatment villages) 
Have not received microfinance services 






















The household survey also applied a choice-based sampling technique (i.e., 
eligible households were over-sampled), which allows one to gain reliable data with least 
costs spent on data collection (Lancaster and Imbens, 1991; Imbens, 1992). With the 
available information on population of eligible and ineligible households, the conversion   11 
to full population is straightforward using the sampling weight, which is the inverse of 
the probability of being sampled in each stratum (i.e., group). 
 
3.2  CHOICE OF VARIABLES 
The choice of variables selected for effectiveness analysis is summarised in 
Table 2. As can be seen, the welfare indicators focus on direct and expected household 
outcomes,  namely  income  and  consumption.  The  effects  of  the  contribution  of 
microfinance  to  household  welfare  will  be  identified  by  examining  the  relationship 
between the duration in microfinance and amount of loans received, after controlling for 
characteristics of households and villages.  
Table 2: List of variables 
Welfare Indicators  Household characteristics 
·  Household income  ·  Age of household head 
·  Income per person  ·  Sex of household head 
·  Income per adult equivalent  ·  Household size 
·  Household consumption  ·  Number of labour 
·  Consumption per person  ·  Dependent ratio 
·  Consumption per adult 
equivalent 
·  Education of labour (average education 
level of persons in the labour age) 
  ·  Capital stock 
·  Arable land 
  ·  Shocks encountered 
Microfinance Intervention  Village characteristics 
·  Eligibility criteria  ·  Casual wage 
·  Loans from microfinance  ·  Price of rice 
·  Months in microfinance  ·  Availability of grid electricity 
  ·  Availability of paved road 
  ·  Distance to township 
 
3.2.1  Welfare indicators (Yij) 
As  the  ultimate  goal  of  microfinance  is  to  improve  the  livelihood  of  the 
economically active poor, the effects of microfinance should be measured by changes in 
the welfare of clients. Many variables can be used to measure a change in welfare, such   12 
as  income  and  consumption  (proxies  for  economic  wellbeing);  education  and  health 
spending (proxies for human capital); and spending on social events (a proxy for social 
capital). The effects of microfinance analysed in this paper focus on economic indicators, 
including income and consumption per adult equivalent. In addition, the study examined 
microfinance effects on poverty reduction and some detailed welfare measure such as 
education level and health status. 
 
3.2.2  Household Characteristics (Xij) 
Household  characteristics  considered  here  include  the  dependency  ratio, 
number  of  labourers,  arable  land,  average  education  level  of  labourer,  and  age  of 
household head. The dependency ratio is defined as the number of people outside the 
working age range divided by the number of people aged within that range (16-60 years). 
It is expected that households with a higher dependency ratio would have more difficulty 
improving  their  living  standard.  The  number  of  labourers  represents  the  production 
capacity since most production activities in rural areas are labour intensive. It is expected 
that a household with more available labour would be able to generate higher income, 
ceteris paribus. 
The average education level of labour in a household is a proxy for the ability 
to learn and apply technologies in production. It is expected that households with a more 
educated labour force have the ability to generate a higher income and/or consumption 
level.  Unlike  previous  studies,  which  selected  only  the  education  level  of  household 
heads, we argued that the education level of other members in the labour age may also 
affect household production. 
The next variable is productive land, which also represents the capacity of 
households since most households surveyed were farmers. It is expected that households 
with  more  production  land,  ceteris  paribus,  would  have  a  higher  output  volume  and 
higher income. However, in rural Vietnam land was allocated by the government equally 
to individuals while the market for production land does not legally exist. Hence, the   13 
average land variable may not be a significant determinant to household welfare as one 
would expect. 
The age of the household head is selected as one household characteristic that 
may affect the performance of the household’s economic wellbeing. Particularly, age of 
the household head and income or consumption may have a quadratic relationship (i.e., 
income generated by household heads and their family increase to a peak as their career 
develops then declines when they get to retirement age), hence the age of the household 
head should be squared. However, this argument may not hold strongly in rural Vietnam 
because it does not take into account the fact that parents often live in the same house 
with their children when they retire (i.e., their children will often be household heads) so 
that income from their children can keep the average household consumption smoothed. 
Therefore, we did not use the quadratic form of this variable as household heads will be 
concentrated in the labour age. 
The household capital stock is also an important determinant of economic 
outcomes.  It  is  expected  that  households  with  higher  capital  stock,  especially  non-
residential capital stock, will be able to generate higher income. The main issue with 
capital stock measurement in rural households is the lack of proper accounting records, 
making it difficult for one to value the current capital stock of households. We proximate 
capital stock by consulting opinions of villager leaders and group of households on the 
value of key capital items, such as threshing machines and bullocks.  
Shocks  (e.g.,  illness,  burglary,  fire  and  loss  of  crops)  could  create 
considerable impacts on household income and consumption. Particularly, shocks can 
reduce current income, forcing a household to switch on a modest consumption level, 
which may lead to loss of productivity (e.g., due to poor health), and hence, reduced 
future income. Therefore, a shock dummy variable is recorded by asking if households 
have experienced any kind of shock within the 12 months prior to the survey period. 
   14 
3.2.3  Village characteristics 
The  village  characteristics  that  are  likely  to  influence  household  welfare 
include the availability of electricity, road quality and the distance to a township. The 
available of electricity influence the ability of villages to apply labour saving techniques 
in production and in life. Likewise, road conditions have a great influence on the ability 
of households to trade with the outside world. It is expected that both electricity and road 
conditions  have  positive  influences  on  income  and  consumption.  The  distance  to  a 
township  is  selected  to  capture  the  influence  of  location  on  household  welfare.  It  is 
expected that villages located closer to a township will have easier access to a market 
place, and off-farm job opportunities (e.g., the proximity to a township can promote the 
production  and  welfare  of  households  by  making  it  easier  to  sell  non-subsistence 
products,  and  to  buy  productive  inputs),  and  hence,  lead  to  higher  income  and 
consumption.  
Prices of inputs and outputs may also influence the economic performance of 
households. In this study, the price of rice, which is the primary product of most rural 
households and a staple food in Vietnam, is selected. The wage rate for casual labour, 
which is a typical form of labour needed in rural Vietnam, is also selected. The effect of 
the rice price and casual labour wages on household income and consumption is not 
clear. If households sell rice and/or work as hired labour, then a rise in the prices will 
have  a  positive  effect  upon  household  income.  Meanwhile,  if  households  need  to 
purchase  rice  and  hire  labour  then  a  rise  in  prices  would  have  a  negative  effect  on 
household income. 
 
3.2.4  Eligibility and treatment variables  
The eligibility dummy variable (i.e., equals one for eligible households and 
zero otherwise), is a function of the unobservable characteristics that permits households 
to join microfinance programs, is expected to have a negative sign because microfinance 
targets poor households.   15 
The  choices  of  possible  treatment  variables  include  the  amount  of  funds 
loaned and the duration of member participation in microfinance. The coefficient of the 
amount  of  loan  received  from  microfinance  measures  effects  per  VND  lent  to 
households. One may argue that households also receive credit from other sources but 
money is fungible (i.e., one cannot recognise the contribution from microfinance loans 
and loans from other sources to household welfare), so total household loans should be 
used. This is a reasonable argument but one may face difficulty differentiating control 
and  treatment  groups  as  loans  outside  microfinance  of  all  groups  are  very  similar, 
especially in treatment villages. Apart from credit NMPs provide other financial services 
such as savings and other development activities such as literacy and health care, hence, 
using total loans will implicitly assume that there is no other effect from other integrated 
services.  In  addition,  there  are  some  practical  difficulties  in  using  loan  volume.  The 
outstanding loan is not perfectly relevant as it does not reflect the progressive lending 
policy of NMPs (i.e., due to high demand for fund and limited resources of donors and/or 
governments).  Meanwhile,  the  cumulative  volume  of  loans  was  difficult  to  obtain 
because rural households often did not keep neat financial records of previous  years. 
Therefore,  this  study  used  the  duration  (i.e.,  number  of  months)  that  households  are 
microfinance members as a treatment variable since it is easier to collect and reflect the 
progressive nature of microfinance effects. 
 
3.3  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The means of the main variables show that some household characteristics 
are similar between the four groups. For example, the household heads surveyed share 
the characteristics of being approximately 40 years of age, completed secondary junior 
school (i.e., grade 7), having a family of five persons with two persons in the labour 
force. Other variables revealed that the majority of households owned their houses (the 
few exceptions are people who live in the houses of their parents); around two-thirds of   16 
households  own  at  least  one  television  set  (TV)  and  one-third  own  at  least  one 
motorcycle
14. 
It  is  shown  that  all  four  groups  use  loans  from  external  sources  for  their 
financial needs, whether or not they participated in microfinance programs. This suggests 
that this demand is a basic need of poor households. In addition, the amount of loans 
borrowed  among  the  four  groups  was  not  differed  significantly.  The  mean  values  of 
selected welfare indicators such as income and consumption are as expected, that eligible 
groups are poorer than those of ineligible groups. However, these indicators suggest that 
microfinance members are generally better off than non- members. 
The means of main household welfare indicators also suggest that access to 
microfinance  may  create  positive  effects  for  its  clients.  For  example,  income  and 
consumption of eligible households in member villages (i.e., Group 1) is respectively 
18.8 and 16.56 percent higher than the relevant households in non-member villages (i.e., 
Group 3). The relative figures for income and consumption per adult equivalent are 13.53 
and 13.86 percent. Since the total loans (from microfinance and other sources) of member 
households is 25.3 percent higher than that of non-member households, one may suggest 
that elasticity of microfinance to household welfare is small. 
Some dummy variables, representing the characteristics of households (i.e., 
sex  of  household  head,  ownership  of  houses,  and  household  accessories)  are  similar 
among the four groups. The only exception is the ownership of a TV, which differed 
among all four groups as well as between eligible and ineligible households. One possible 
reason for this difference may due to the lack of control for the quality of TV, and hence, 
the proportion of TV ownership does not reflect the differences in wealth of different 
groups. 
 
                                                 
14 Rental property is almost a missing market in rural Vietnam because it is relatively cheap and easy to 
construct a rural shelter while land was allocated by the government. TVs and other housing accessories did 
not count for quality (e.g., TVs and motorcycles may be old and of cheap brands), hence, the households 
were not as “rich” as one may think.   17 










(n=29)  Variables  Unit/Description 
Mean  Std.  Mean  Std.  Mean  Std.  Mean  Std.  Mean  Std. 
Age  Years  40.66  8.82  40.21  8.09  39.88  8.84  41.60  10.00  40.10  7.30 
Education level  Years  7.13  1.89  7.19  1.77  7.24  1.85  6.96  2.08  7.38  1.76 
Education of labour  Years  7.12  1.57  7.18  1.49  7.29  1.35  6.95  1.73  7.47  1.61 
Household size  Persons  4.73  1.45  4.86  1.44  4.54  1.47  4.61  1.50  4.66  1.29 
Number of labour  Persons  2.36  0.94  2.38  0.93  2.20  0.84  2.40  1.02  2.17  0.60 
Dependent ratio  Dependents/labour  1.18  0.80  1.22  0.83  1.25  0.84  1.08  0.78  1.23  0.68 
Land per capita  M
2/person  1200  481  1214  286  762  258  1270  625  1298  728 
Number of loans  Loans  1.44  1.32  1.76  1.22  1.12  1.05  1.07  1.35  1.31  1.65 
Total borrowing   VND’000  2888  3663  3163  3529  2246  2443  2525  3867  3603  4703 
Household income  VND’000/year  13922  11057  14491  10298  18206  17818  12198  10125  12952  7749 
Income per capita  VND’000/year  3070  2444  3071  2142  4326  4497  2780  2143  2931  1778 
Income per adult equivalent  VND’000/year  4226  3327  4272  2995  5942  6262  3763  2708  4042  2423 
Household consumption  VND’000/year  10817  7585  10847  5793  15746  12151  9306  8114  12159  6156 
Consumption per capita  VND’000/year  2405  1589  2342  1276  3697  2985  2096  1271  2836  1815 
Consumption per adult equivalent  VND’000/year  3307  2144  3244  1719  5086  4157  2849  1640  3901  2385 
Household net income  VND’000/year  3104  8365  3645  9296  2460  10322  2893  6326  793  7224 
Dummy variables                       
Sex  1=male; 0=female  0.38  0.48  0.34  0.48  0.32  0.47  0.41  0.49  0.52  0.51 
Profession   1=farmer; 0=others  0.94  0.23  0.94  0.24  0.90  0.3  0.95  0.22  1.00  0.00 
Owned a house  1=yes, 0=no  0.95  0.22  0.95  0.21  0.98  0.16  0.93  0.25  1.00  0.00 
Owned a TV  1=yes, 0=no  0.68  0.47  0.73  0.45  0.78  0.42  0.62  0.49  0.55  0.51 
Owned a motorcycle  1=yes, 0=no  0.34  0.47  0.30  0.46  0.41  0.5  0.36  0.48  0.41  0.50 
Note: Group 1=Eligible households in member villages; Group 2= Ineligible households in member villages; Group 3=Eligible in non-member villages; Group 4=Ineligible 
households in non-member villages. 
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The characteristics of the four groups of households surveyed were tested 
using the analysis of variance (ANOVA) for continuous variables. Since some variables 
such  as  income  and  consumption  are  highly  skewed,  the  Kruskal-Wallis  test  for  the 
differences  in  the  median  was  also  conducted  for  comparison.  Some  household 
characteristics  such  as  sex  and  ownership  of  houses  and  household  accessories  are 
represented by dummy variables, and hence, the average value of these variables will be 
in the range between zero and one. Therefore, a test for differences between proportional 
variables among more than two groups was conducted (Table 4). 
Table 4: Test for the equality of household characteristics (p-values) 









Age  0.40  0.57  0.12  0.23  0.92  0.62 
Education level  0.54  0.58  0.24  0.28  0.77  0.46 
Education of labour  0.24  0.38  0.15  0.23  0.65  0.41 
Household size  0.27  0.27  0.08  0.11  0.74  0.39 
Number of labour  0.42  0.62  0.90  0.81  0.92  0.68 
Dependent ratio  0.29  0.25  *0.07  *0.07  0.91  0.91 
Land per capita  0.81  ***0.00  0.86  ***0.00  0.47  **0.04 
Loans in 2003  ***0.00  ***0.00  ***0.00  ***0.00  0.55  0.89 
Total borrowing   0.15  ***0.00  0.09  ***0.00  0.13  0.58 
Household income  ***0.01  ***0.01  **0.04  ***0.00  **0.05  0.32 
Income per capita  ***0.00  **0.03  0.24  ***0.01  **0.02  0.39 
Income per adult equivalent  ***0.00  **0.02  0.13  ***0.01  **0.02  0.46 
Household consumption  ***0.00  ***0.00  **0.04  ***0.00  **0.05  0.29 
Consumption per capita  ***0.00  ***0.00  0.11  ***0.01  **0.02  0.11 
Consumption per adult equivalent  ***0.00  ***0.00  *0.06  ***0.00  **0.02  0.12 
Household net income  0.31  0.14  0.38  0.52  0.41  0.26 
Dummy variables  Proportion
iii 
Sex  0.15  0.14  0.09 
Profession   0.35  0.66  0.08 
Owned a house  0.36  0.37  0.40 
Owned a TV  **0.03  **0.03  **0.04 
Owned a motorcycle  0.24  0.16  0.99 
Note: Group 1=Eligible households in treatment villages; Group 2= Ineligible households in treatment villages; Group 
3=Eligible in control villages; Group 4=Ineligible households in control villages. ***, **, and * indicates that the null 
hypothesis is rejected at 99 percent, 95 percent and 90 percent levels, respectively. 
i ANOVA test is used to compare group means.  
ii the Kruskal-Wallis tested is also conducted to compare group medians.  
iii  Proportion  test  for  categorical  variables  (i.e.,  sex,  profession,  owned  a  house,  owned  a  TV,  owned  a 
motorcycle).  
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Test  statistics  showed  that  there  is  no  significant  difference  among  four 
groups of households in main characteristics, including sex, age, and education level of 
household  heads,  household  size,  number  of  labour,  dependency  ratio,  ownership  of 
house  and  major  household  accessories.  However,  there  is  a  statistically  significant 
difference  among  four  groups  in  terms  of  land  per  capita.  For  example,  eligible 
households in member villages own 1,214 m
2 per person while the figure of ineligible 
households is 762 m
2 per person. One possible reason is that the non-member group in 
treatment  villages  includes  some  households  with  spouses  who  have  off-farm 
employment, such as village school teachers, therefore, they were not allocated as much 
production land as other households. 
The mean of the total household loans borrowed from all sources in 2003 are 
not statistically different among the four groups. However, the median test suggests that 
the  total  loans  of  households  differ  significantly,  and  such  differences  focus  only  on 
eligible households in member villages and those in non-member villages (i.e., Group 1 
and Group 3). Since the skewness test suggests that the distribution of total loans was not 
normal, the Kruskal-Wallis test could be more relevant. The results of the median test on 
the total loan suggest that: a) microfinance has some contribution to the differences in 
household borrowing, and b) the sample of control groups (i.e., Group 2 and Group 4) are 
comparable. 
Although in member villages eligible households were able to borrow more 
than ineligible households (i.e., from sources other than microfinance), in non-member 
villages  ineligible  households  could  mobilise  much  more  credit  compared  to  eligible 
households. One may argue that the availability of microfinance services improves the 
creditworthiness of members because it was observed that they were able to mobilise 
credit from other sources similarly to ineligible households in the same village.
15  
                                                 
15 The average loans from all sources of the two groups in the treatment villages were 3.163 and 2.246 
million VND, respectively. Given the average amount of loans from microfinance is 0.767 million VND, it 
can be said that loans of these two groups mobilised outside microfinance programs were similar.    20 
The test of the null hypothesis that mean/median or proportion of household 
characteristics and economic performance of the eligible groups (i.e., group 1 and group 
3) and ineligible groups (i.e., group 2 and group 4) in the control and treatment villages 
are equal, also indicates that most characteristics of the two groups were not significantly 
different,  except  for  the  number  of  loans.  This  partly  reflects  the  purpose-designed 
products of microfinance programs (i.e., small loans with many instalments to ensure 
ease of repayment and to screen out the rich). Household income and consumption levels 
of  the  two  groups  do  differ  at  a  95  percent  significant  level,  with  the  means  of  the 
economic indicators showing that member households were better-off than their non-
member counterparts. The test statistics also suggest that the specially designed survey 
may reach the aim of providing a relevant comparison since most observable household 
characteristics in the control and treatment groups are similar.  
The  income  and  consumption  data  show  a  skewed  distribution  due  to  the 
presence of several rich households in the sample. This suggests that the Kruskal-Wallis 
test  is  more  relevant  when  comparing  the  values  of  these  variables  among  the  four 
groups. The skewness of these variables also suggests that heterokedasticity may affect 
linear  regressions.  However,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  relationship  between  household 
outcomes  and  microfinance  access  has  a  linear  relationship.  One  possible  non-linear 
relationship of microfinance and household outcomes could be in the log form, reflecting 
diminishing  returns  of  economic  outcomes.  The  convenience  of  the  logarithm 
transformation is that log-normal is one of the distributions that fits income data well 
(Singh  and  Maddala,  1976).  In  this  study,  the  logarithm  of  income  and  consumption 
resembles normal distributions, and therefore, the heterokedasticity issue may not appear 
if the logarithm of income and consumption is used. 
 
4.  ECONOMETRICS ANALYSIS 
4.1  SPECIFICATION OF ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
One of the concerns with using the logarithmic functional form with our data 
is the presence of zero values for many variables such as duration in microfinance and   21 
amount of loans. Traditional treatments, such as using an arbitrarily small number to 
replace zero values, violate the independence of measurement unit in regression analysis. 
In addition, in the case where zero values represented a significant proportion of the 
sample as in this study (i.e., all non-member households have zero values in microfinance 
participation), the above approach would lead to biased estimations of the parameters. 
Battese (1997) proposed a clever treatment with dummy variables so that the efficient 
estimation can be obtained without any bias. Applying this treatment to the data in our 
study, the effects of microfinance to household welfare can be measured in a reduced 
form equation as follows:  
* * 2 * *
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 ln ln (ln ) ij ij ij ij ij ij j ij Y E D T T X V b b b b b b b m = + + + + + + +   (13) 
Where:  
·  lnYij is the log of household welfare indicators such as income or consumption; 
·  Eij is the eligibility dummy variable, equal to one for eligible households (in both 
the control and treatment villages) and zero for ineligible households;  
·  Dij  is  the  dummy  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  one  for  non-members,  zero 
otherwise; 
· 
* max( , ) ij ij ij T T D = , where Tij is the treatment variable (i.e., number of months in 
microfinance), and Dij=1 if Tij=0 and zero otherwise; 
· 
* *
ij ln  if X >0 and  =0 otherwise ij ij ij X X X = ,  where  Xij  is  a  vector  of  household 
characteristics such as age, sex, education and labour;  
· 
* *
ij ln  if V >0, and  = 0 otherwise j j j V V V = ,  where  Vj  is  a  vector  of  village 
characteristics such as prices and infrastructure conditions;  
·  mij is the idiosyncratic error term; and 
·  b1, b2, b3, b4 and b5 are the parameters to be estimated. 
 
In the above equation, parameter b1 measures differences between eligible 
and  ineligible  households  while  b2  measures  differences  between  members  and  non-
members. Parameter b3 and b4 measures the effects of microfinance upon its clients while 
parameters b5 and b6 represent the relationships between selected household and village 
characteristics and the selected welfare indicator.    22 
The use of the eligibility variable Eij and the results of basic tests suggest that 
the self-selection issue would be mitigated. Because most other observable characteristics 
were controlled, the parameter b1 of the eligibility variable Eij in equation (13) would 
capture  unobservable  characteristics  that  made  eligible  households  decide  to  join 
microfinance  programs.  In  addition,  the  ANOVA,  Kruskal-Wallis  and  Chi-squared 
proportion tests show that the main characteristics of eligible households in the control 
and treatment villages were not statistically different. Since the control and treatment 
villages  are  neighbours,  it  is  possible  that  the  unobservable  characteristics  of  these 
households  are  similar.  In  addition,  observations  in  the  field  revealed  very  few 
households  who  were  eligible  but  had  not  yet  joined  the  microfinance  program. 
Therefore, we expect that self-selection may not be a significant issue in this case. 
 
4.1.1  Test for endogeneity and model specification 
4.1.1.1  Endogeneity test 
As mentioned previously, there is an endogeneity issue when analysing the 
effects  of  microfinance.  The  determinants  of  microfinance  participation  such  as  age, 
education level and asset level also determine the household welfare. The test for the 
endogeneity of microfinance participation is conducted by the Wu-Hausman test using 
the  artificial  regression  approach.  The  advantage  of  this  test  is  that  it  can  avoid  the 
popular non-positive definite problems associated with finite sample data (Baum et al., 
2003).  
The test results for all household welfare indicators only ranged from 0.04 to 
0.48, suggesting the null hypothesis (i.e., access to microfinance is exogenous) could not 
be rejected (see Table 5). The test results confirmed that the quasi-experimental survey 
has  eliminated  the  self-selection  issues  since  participation  in  microfinance  is  only 
available  for  eligible  households.  The  exogeneity  of  access  to  microfinance  services 
means that it is possible to use standard regressions (i.e., ordinary least squares, Tobit and 
Probit) in the effectiveness analysis.    23 
Table 5: Test for endogeneity of participation in microfinance 
Wu-Hausman test  Outcome variables 
Test-statistics F(1,451)  p-value 
Total income  0.040  0.841 
Average income  0.040  0.841 
Income per adult equivalent  0.044  0.833 
Total expenditure  0.492  0.483 
Average expenditure  0.492  0.483 
Expenditure per adult equivalent  0.476  0.491 
 
4.1.1.2  Model specification test 
As  mentioned  previously,  this  study  used  a  quasi-experimental  survey 
approach to mitigate the possible biases in microfinance effect analysis due to the non-
random  program  placement  issue.  Despite  selecting  relevant  control  and  treatment 
villages with this specially designed survey, bias is only eliminated if the order in which 
eligible villages joint microfinance programs is random. If this is the case, the village 
characteristics specification of equation (13) can be estimated efficiently and consistently 
using  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS).  If  the  order  in  which  eligible  villages  receive 
microfinance  services  is  not  random,  OLS  may  provide  inconsistent  estimates  for 
equation (13) using village characteristics specification. The inconsistency is due to the 
possible  correlation  between  the  availability  of  microfinance  (i.e.,  proxied  by  the 
treatment variable Tij because almost all eligible households join microfinance programs) 
and  the  error  term  (mij),  which  includes  some  unobservable  village  characteristics.  If 
village Vj was replaced by a set of village dummy variables, representing a village fixed-
effect model, it should capture all (observable and unobservable) characteristics within 
each village, leaving only random errors captured by mij. Therefore, equation (13) will 
provide consistent estimates with the village-fixed effects specification, regardless of the 
order in which villages received microfinance services. 
One concern with the village fixed effect model is that it may be inconsistent 
with censored dependent variables unless it has a large number of observations per fixed 
effect  unit.  Particularly,  the  Monte  Carlo  evidence  provided  by  Heckman  (1999)   24 
suggested that with eight observations or more per fixed-effect unit, the inconsistency 
issue would be insignificant. In this study, the number of observations in each village 
vaied from 15 to 20, which is ample for fixed village-effects models.  
The Hausman-like specification test can be used to determine whether Tj and 
mij  are  correlated.  The  test  statistics,  which  have  a  c
2  distribution,  are  calculated  as 
( ) ( ) ( )
' 1
FE VC FE VC FE VC b b b b
-
- ∑ -∑ - ,where bFE and ∑FE are the coefficients and subset 
of the covariance matrix of the fixed effect model; bVC and ∑VC are the matching set of 
coefficients  and  the  respective  subset  of  the  covariance  matrix  of  the  village 
characteristics model. If the null hypothesis of no correlation between the error terms and 
the regressors is rejected, the fixed effect model is preferred. 
Applying the original Hausman specification test to the data revealed that the 
difference of the covariance matrix of the two models is not positive definite, and hence, 
the test statistics are undefined. This issue is quite common in empirical research with 
finite  samples,  and  could  violate  the  assumption  that  one  estimator  is  asymptotically 
efficient.  This  issue  was  overcome  using  the  generalised  Hausman  test  proposed  by 
Weesie  (1999)  and  extended  by  Creel  (2004),  who  directly  calculated  the  covariance 
matrix of the two alternative estimators using generalised method of moments with the 
combined moment conditions.
16  With the survey data, the generalised Hausman test is 
equivalent to the adjusted Wald test for the equality of common estimators between the 
village-fixed effects and the village characteristics models.
17 If the common parameters 
of the two models are similar, we can argue that the village characteristics models be 
preferred  as  it  can  examine  other  determinants  of  microfinance  effectiveness  such  as 
prices, location and infrastructure. The test results revealed the null hypothesis (i.e., the 
common coefficients of two models are similar) was rejected for all household welfare 
                                                 
16 More details, see Weesie (1999) and Creel (2004). 
17  In  particular,  the  Wald  statistics  is  adjusted  as  ( 1) /( ) d k W kd − + ~  F  (k,  d-k+1),  where  W  is  the 
standard Wald statistics, d is the total number of PSUs minus the number of strata; k is the dimension of the 
hypothesis test. In this study, we have 25 PSUs (i.e., villages) with two strata (i.e., eligible and ineligible 
households) in each village, hence the total PSUs is 50, and d=50-2=48. The dimension of the hypothesis 
k= 16, which equals the numbers of common coefficients of the two models. Therefore, the adjusted Wald 
test statistics is defined at F(16, 48-16+1)=F(16,33) (Korn and Graubard, 1990;  Stata Corporation, 2003, 
p.97).   25 
indicators (see Table 6). Therefore, the village fixed effects model is preferred because it 
has the ability to produce consistent estimates. 
Table 6: The generalised Hausman specification test 
Welfare indicators  Test-statistics: F(16,33)  p-value 
Total income  2.460  0.014 
Average income  2.460  0.014 
Income per adult equivalent  2.450  0.014 
Total expenditure  3.240  0.002 
Average expenditure  3.240  0.002 
Expenditure per adult equivalent  3.250  0.002 
 
4.2  EFFECTS OF MICROFINANCE 
This section presents the empirical results on the effects of microfinance on 
income and consumption of households, and poverty reduction.  
 
4.2.1  Effects on household consumption and income 
Effects  of  microfinance  services  on  income  and  consumption  per  adult 
equivalent  was  analysed  using  village  fixed-effect  regressions,  taking  into  account 
components of the survey design (i.e., sample weight, PSUs, strata). Regressions with 
survey data differ from standard regression in several ways. For example, sample weight 
was used to estimate parameters of interests so that the coefficients of survey estimates 
will  be  the  same  as  those  obtained  from  weighted  least  squares.  However,  the  main 
difference between the survey regressions and standard regressions is the estimation of 
variances  of  the  estimates.  Regressions  with  survey  data  compute  variance  of  the 
estimators using two main approaches, namely Taylor linearization (Huber, 1967;  Kish, 
1995), and through replication techniques such as balance repeated replications (Kish, 
1969), balance half-sampling (McCarty, 1969), Jackknife (Krewski and Rao, 1981), and 
bootstrap (Rao and Wu, 1988). Comparison of alternative methods to calculate variances 
in survey analysis conducted by Kish and Frankel (1974) and Shao (1996) showed little 
difference.  Therefore,  we  used  the  Taylor  linearization  approach  because  it  is  less   26 
computational intensive and able to produce robust estimates using the sandwich variance 
method.  
Microfinance effects on income and consumption per adult equivalent using 
village fixed effects model are presented in Table 7. It can be seen that the log of duration 
(i.e., number of months in microfinance) suggested that NMPs created positive effects on 
income and consumption of member households. Effect on income is larger than that on 
consumption, suggesting that most member households concentrated more on improving 
income than consumption. One reason for this is that most NMPs surveyed, encouraged 
loans for production rather than consumption. In addition, the regular practice of savings 
through  compulsory  accounts  may  make  member  households  more  cautious  about 
increasing consumption. 
Table 7: Effects of microfinance on income and consumption 
Income per adult equivalent  Consumption per adult equivalent  Independent variables 
Coef.  t-ratio  Coef.  t-ratio 
Log of duration  0.185  0.241  0.072  0.080 
Log of duration squared  -0.035  -0.329  -0.009  -0.071 
Participating villages  0.241  1.243  0.281  1.332 
Eligible households  -0.116  -1.324  ***-0.455  -4.221 
Log of dependency ratio  0.054  0.961  0.044  0.978 
Log of household size  ***-0.432  -3.811  ***-0.513  -4.655 
Log of land  ***0.255  4.898  ***0.162  5.104 
Log of capital  ***0.270  5.380  ***0.132  2.455 
Log of labour education  ***0.366  2.898  ***0.275  3.303 
Log of age  ***0.395  2.713  ***0.405  4.324 
Female-head households  *-0.134  -1.690  **-0.144  -2.187 
Shock  -0.076  -0.880  0.036  0.619 
No dependent dummy  0.202  0.805  0.110  0.468 
No land dummy  ***1.204  3.269  0.292  1.011 
No duration dummy  0.229  0.168  0.078  0.047 
Constant  1.430  0.907  **4.112  2.306 
R-squared  0.544  0.631 
Note: ***, **, and * represent 99, 95 and 90 percent significant level, respectively. Village dummies were 
dropped to reserve space. Variables with zero values are treated using the approach of Battese (1997) . 
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The  estimated  coefficients,  which  represent  elasticities  in  this  log-log 
regression, suggest that a ten percent increase in microfinance duration lead to increase in 
income  and  consumption  of  1.85  and  0.72  percent,  respectively.  Since  the  mean  of 
duration in microfinance is 50 months, a 10 percent increase in duration (i.e., 5 months), 
lad to an increase of income per adult equivalent of 1.85%* 4,266 = VND 78,921 (about 
$US  5.0),  while  the  relative  figure  on  consumption  per  adult  equivalent  is  0.72%* 
3,161=22,759 VND (about $US 1.5).
18  
The  sign  of  log  of  duration  squared  is  negative  on  both  the  income  and 
consumption sides, suggesting that the marginal effect of microfinance decreases over 
time. For example, the marginal effect of income 
ln








, where t 
is the number of months in microfinance, and Y is income per adult equivalent. Since t 
and  Y  are  positive,  this  suggests  that  when  the  duration  in  microfinance  equals 
e
(0.185/2*0.035)=14 months, the marginal effect will be zero. One possible interpretation is 
that the contribution of microfinance services concentrates more on smoothing rather than 
increasing the income and consumption levels. 
One reason for the modest contribution of microfinance is its relatively small 
size, compared to the total income or asset of household. The average loan size from 
microfinance  programs  is  VND  700  thousand,  accounting  for  only  5  percent  of  the 
average household income (i.e., VND 14.5 million) of member households. Therefore, 
significant  contribution  of  microfinance  to  household  income  may  be  an  ambitious 
expectation. 
The  eligibility  dummy  variable  has  a  positive  sign  while  the  sign  of  the 
participating  village  dummy  is  negative,  suggesting  that  participating  villages  have  a 
higher  average  income  while  eligible  households  have  lower  levels  of  income  and 
consumption. Due to the dummy nature of these variables, they can be interpreted as the 
percentage  of  difference  between  the  two  groups  separated  by  those  dummies,  after 
                                                 
18 The mean of income and consumption per adult equivalent of member households is 4.3 and 3.2 VND 
million per year, respectively.   28 
controlling for household characteristics. For example, the average log of income per 
adult equivalent in participating village is 24 percent higher than that of non-participating 
villages. Meanwhile, the log of income per adult equivalent of eligible households is, on 
average, 11.6 percent lower than that of ineligible households.  
The magnitude of the eligibility dummy variable is larger (in absolute values) 
on  the  consumption  side,  suggesting  that  eligible  households  have  more  modest 
consumption bundles despite their income being not be too far behind other households. 
This finding supports the theory that the poor are more risk-adverse, and hence, eligible 
(i.e., poor) households in microfinance programs may apply a more modest consumption 
bundle to save some resources as a precaution. However, squeezing consumption too 
much  may  dampen  future  income  due  to  a  decrease  of  productivity  (i.e.,  ill  heath, 
malnourished) and lack of investment, making most of the poor trapped in the circle of 
poverty. 
Income and consumption per adult equivalent was lower for households with 
a high dependency ratio and larger household size as the log of dependency ratio and 
household size have negative signs. Since the dependency ratio was defined as the ratio 
of  dependents  over  labourers,  households  with  a  high  dependency  ratio  may  have 
relatively lower labour productivity as more time and resources are required to serve their 
dependents. Since the household size is positively correlated to the number of labourers, 
we dropped this variable to avoid mitigating the effects of colinearity, but household size 
can be used as a proxy to examine the contribution of labour.
19 Therefore, it was surprise 
that  households  with  more  labour  have  a  lower  income  and  consumption  per  adult 
equivalent.  However,  at  the  household  level  household  size,  and  hence,  labour  have 
positive  and  significant  contribution  to  income  and  consumption  as  expected.  One 
possible reason for this behaviour may due to the diminishing marginal return to labour, 
hence,  households  with  more  labour  can  achieve  a  higher  production  level  but  the 
                                                 
19 The correlation coefficient between labour and household size is 0.5 with a 99 percent significant level. 
We tried to include both variables and the result was that both were insignificant while it was significant 
when  dropping  one  variable.  We  kept  household  size  since  it  can  be  used  as  a  proxy  for  household 
production scale, especially when some dependents are mobilised in production activities.   29 
average output may decrease. In addition, agricultural production is highly seasonal, thus 
the average return may be lower for large families when it is difficult to find off-season 
employment. 
The coefficient of production land is significantly and positively related to 
income and consumption, confirming that land is the primary input of rural households. 
Since most rural households are involved in agricultural production, it is reasonable that 
having more land could generate higher income and consumption. The magnitude of this 
variable is relatively high, and is only slightly less than that of physical capital but it still 
shows  an  inelastic  response  to  income  and  consumption.  In  particular,  a  one  percent 
increase in production land can lead to 0.26 percent increase in income and 0.16 percent 
increase  in  consumption  per  adult  equivalent.  One  possible  reason  for  the  modest 
responses of the production inputs to income and consumption may be due to the lack of 
knowledge of how to exploit inputs effectively.  
One important input for rural households was physical capital
20, which have 
positive and significant effects on per adult equivalent income and consumption. One 
possible reason is that physical capital is a production input, and hence, its contribution 
income  more  direct  than  that  to  consumption.  Despite  the  magnitude  of  the  physical 
capital  was  higher  than  that  of  production  land,  it  remained  quite  inelastic  as  a  one 
percent increase in physical capital lead to only a 0.27 percent increase in income per 
adult equivalent. One possible reason may be due to the relative small production scale of 
rural households in Vietnam, hence, machinery may be under utilised.  
The two proxies for human capital, namely the average education of labour 
(representing knowledge), and age of household heads (representing experience) have a 
significant  and  positive  contribution  to  income  and  consumption  of  households.  The 
positive contribution of labour education suggested that households with a more educated 
labour force may have a higher capacity or ability to learn and apply new skills, which 
                                                 
20 The physical capital in this study is measured by the estimated current value of production equipment 
(e.g., oxcart, tractor, threshing machine, and shed), livestock (e.g., bullock and sow), and transport means 
(e.g., motorcycles and bicycles). The evaluation of capital stock was conducted by counting capital stock 
items at the household survey and price information collected from the survey with village heads.   30 
can lead to an improvement of income and consumption. The positive coefficient of the 
age variable is also explainable since the average age of a microfinance member in this 
study is 40, which is around the middle of the most productive age. 
The dummy variable for female head households has negative and significant 
coefficients, which is as expected since those are often disadvantage households such as 
single mothers, widows, divorcees or households with males employed frequently in off-
farm  activities.  Female  headed-households  often  lack  sufficient  labour,  an  important 
input for most agricultural production activities.   
The shock dummy variable is not significant although its signs (i.e., negative 
on income and positive on consumption) are as expected. Households suffering a shock 
within 12 months of the survey seem to have a reduction in income and an expansion in 
spending (although not significant and with a small magnitude). This suggests that the 
nature  of  most  shocks  resulted  in  a  sudden  increase  of  spending  such  as  increasing 
medical bills due to sickness or reinvestment in failed projects. Although these shocks 
also lead to a reduction of income, its significant effects on income may take a little while 
to occur (i.e., this survey only covered income and consumption in 2003 while shocks in 
this year may lead to reduction of income in 2004). Another possible reason is that most 
households encountered minor shocks, which create insignificant impacts to income and 
consumption.  
It  is  expected  that  the  Battese  (1997)  dummy  for  households  with  no 
dependents received a positive sign since they have more labour with a possible higher 
productivity to generate more income, and hence, to enjoy a higher level of consumption. 
However, it is against our expectation as households with no production land have a 
higher  income  and  consumption  per  adult  equivalent.  One  possible  reason  is  that 
households with no arable land did not participate in agricultural production but focused   31 
on non-farm activities such as small trading and services, which often have a higher and 
more regular cash return than small-scale agricultural production
21. 
The dummy for households that did not participate in microfinance programs 
was positive but it did not have much intuitive interpretation. In essence, it represents the 
average  income  and  consumption  of  households  in  non-participating  villages  (both 
eligible and ineligible) together with ineligible households in member villages. Therefore, 
the result of the averaging is uncertain since ineligible households are often wealthier 
while eligible but not participating households are generally poorer. 
We  also  examined  effects  of  microfinance  on  main  consumption  items, 
including education, food, health care, entertainment and social affair (e.g., donation to 
charities  and  purchase  gifts  for  weddings).  The  results  showed  that  participating  in 
microfinance increased spending for education, food, entertainment and social affairs but 
the  spending  on  health  care  decreased.
22  Since  health  spending  in  this  study  referred 
mainly to the purchase of medications and payments for doctor visits, a decrease of this 
item  could  be  interpreted  as  having  better  health.  Although  none  of  the  relationship 
between  access  to  microfinance  and  major  consumption  items  was  statistically 
significant, it still showed a positive picture that microfinance services may create desired 
effects on household welfare (see Table 8).  
Other important determinants of these consumption items are household size, 
education of labour and the age of household heads. In particular, larger households seem 
to have higher spending on essential items such as food, education and health care but 
more restrictive on luxury items such as entertainment. The physical capital also provides 
an interesting interpretation in that the relatively richer households pay more attention to 
entertainment rather than education. 
                                                 
21 To sketch the production scale of households in this study, recall that the arable land per person was only 
1200 square meters, on average. 
22 These consumption items were only estimated at the household level because we know in advance that 
some items were only consumed by certain groups (i.e., education spending were often for children while 
social affairs spending are mainly for men) but the survey did not collect detailed information on gender by 
age groups.    32 
Table 8: Microfinance Effects on main consumption items 
Variables  Education  Food  Health Entertainment  Social affair
Log of duration  1.927  0.648  -0.833  4.381  0.142
Log of duration squared  -0.178  -0.096  0.162  -0.604  -0.043
Eligible villages  ***1.879  **-0.346  *1.115  ***3.045  ***2.469
Eligible households  0.137  ***-0.436  ***-0.932  -0.636  -0.461
Log of dependency ratio  ***0.695  -0.006  0.231  *0.454  0.033
Log of household size  ***2.127  ***0.299  *0.860  -0.764  0.065
Log of capital  0.050  *0.068  0.224  **0.846  0.040
Log of labour education  ***1.877  0.137  ***0.869  -0.275  0.519
Log of land  *0.298  0.052  0.078  0.243  ***0.369
Log of age  1.305  ***0.383  -0.131  ***1.697  ***1.519
Gender  0.003  -0.037  **-0.921  -0.761  -0.385
Shock  -0.249  0.099  ***1.096  0.331  -0.052
No dependent dummy  1.052  -0.011  1.517  1.548  0.335
No land dummy  0.690  0.203  0.381  -2.720  -0.034
No duration dummy  5.227  0.928  -1.597  7.782  -0.314
Constant  ***-17.828  ***4.719  -0.252  ***-24.240  -4.619
R-squared  0.443  0.559  0.310  0.406  0.231
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *  represent  99,  95  and  90  percent  significant  level,  respectively.  Village  dummy 
variables are not reported. Variables with zero values are treated using the approach of Battese (1997) . 
 
4.2.2  Effects on poverty reduction 
The relationship between access to microfinance and incidence of poverty can 
provide  additional  useful  information.  Probit  regressions  are  suitable  for  estimating 
effects  of  microfinance  on  the  poverty  status  of  households.  In  order  to  test  for  the 
sensitivity of findings with different choices of poverty lines, three measures of poverty, 
namely the national poverty line
23, the participatory wealth ranking (PWR)
24, and the 
international “one dollar a day” poverty line, are applied. It can be seen that the national 
                                                 
23 At the time conducting this survey, the national poverty line was VND 100,000 per person per month for 
rural areas, which is about 20 US cents per person per day. 
24 This poverty line is measured in a relative sense with judgements from various criteria such as food 
sufficiency status, housing condition and amount of land. Generally, it may be a little bit higher than the 
national poverty line as NMPs tried to serve poor households ineligible for loans from the Vietnam Bank 
for the Poor (i.e., those under national poverty line).   33 
poverty line covers the extreme poor, the PWR line is a little bit wider because it takes 
into account other aspects of poverty such as housing, and the international poverty line 
covers almost all households surveyed.  
With the survey data pseudo likelihood estimators are used instead of true 
likelihood  estimators,  and  therefore  standard  statistics  like  pseudo  R-squared  or 
likelihood ratio tests are no longer valid (Stata Corporation, 2003, p.28). In essence, the 
point estimate from the pseudo-likelihood estimators is a weighted log likelihood of the 
standard maximum likelihood approach. With survey data, the weighted likelihood is not 
the distribution of the sample, and hence, it is not the true likelihood. 
Table 9: Microfinance and poverty incidence 
National poverty line 
(about $20 cents/day)  PWR poverty line  International poverty line 
($1US/day)  Independent variables 
Coef.  t-ratio  Coef.  t-ratio  Coef.  t-ratio 
Log of duration  -2.131  -1.062  *-3.615  -1.907  *5.264  1.711 
Log of duration squared  0.359  1.160  *0.498  1.706  **-0.793  -1.965 
Member villages  **-1.201  -2.053  -0.291  -0.298  -1.122  -0.117 
Eligible households  0.305  0.897  **-0.691  -2.148  0.086  0.166 
Log of dependency ratio  -0.157  -0.732  -0.038  -0.171  -0.205  -0.703 
Log of household size  ***1.018  2.339  -0.169  -0.506  ***2.024  2.764 
Log of land  *-0.363  -1.670  -0.030  -0.180  ***-0.642  -3.244 
Log of capital  ***-0.426  -3.095  ***-1.644  -6.743  ***-1.662  -3.000 
Log of labour education  ***-1.199  -2.691  ***-1.121  -3.030  -0.544  -0.997 
Log of age  -0.554  -0.953  *-0.715  -1.842  -0.911  -1.112 
Female-head households  *0.549  1.837  0.152  0.416  *0.982  1.660 
Shock  0.120  0.382  0.182  0.791  0.226  0.546 
No dependent dummy        -1.192  -1.196  -1.331  -1.020 
No land dummy        -0.119  -0.086  ***-3.510  -2.663 
No duration dummy  -3.046  -0.909  ***-7.796  -2.491  7.563  1.272 
Constant  ***12.738  2.376   ***28.919  5.860  ***22.726  5.598 
Note: The significant levels of the estimates are: ***, ** and * represent 99, 95 and 90 percent significant 
levels, respectively. Zero values are treated using Battese (1997)’s method. The dummy variables for zero 
values of the dependency ratio and arable land were dropped in the Probit regression with the national 
poverty line because of perfect multi-colinearity.  
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Results of Probit estimates presented in Table 9 showed that the probability 
of a household being poor was reduced by length of the duration in microfinance when at 
the level of the national and the PWR poverty lines. In contrast, the probability for a 
household  in  the  international  poverty  line  increased  significantly  with  the  time  in 
microfinance programs. A possible reason is that poor households (using the national or 
PWR  poverty  lines)  may  have  improved  their  living  conditions  by  accessing 
microfinance but the improvement still left them under the international poverty line. 
Therefore,  the  number  of  poor  clients  under  the  international  poverty  line  increased 
significantly due to the raise in number of members in NMPs. 
The log of duration squared of all three regressions suggested the expected 
behaviour that poverty reduction effects of microfinance services is decreasing over time 
while the rate that poor households shifted from local to international poverty lines was 
decreasing. Similar to the log of duration, this relationship was significant only when the 
PWR and international poverty line were used. 
It is interesting that the dummy variables for member villages recorded an 
expected  negative  sign  since  poorer  villages  get  a  higher  priority  in  receiving 
microfinance services.  As expected, after receiving microfinance services the  average 
poverty rate in member villages decreased. The negative and significant estimates on the 
eligible  household  dummy  under  the  PWR  poverty  line  is  against  the  expectation  as 
NMPs target poor households. This may be due to the subjective nature of the PWR 
poverty line, making it difficult to compare villages. Therefore, the average value of the 
PWR ranking across villages may not provide much intuitive interpretation. However, the 
national poverty line shows an expected behaviour that eligible households have a higher 
probability of being poor but this relationship is not significant. 
The estimates for the dependency ratio and household size received counter 
intuitive  signs.  The  negative  sign  of  the  dependency  ratio  suggests  that  those  with  a 
higher dependency ratio have less probability of being poor while households of larger 
size, which also mean having more labour, have a significantly higher chance of being 
poor unless evaluated by the PWR line. It is possible that small size households with 
workable dependents can organise their labour usage more efficiently, and hence, lower   35 
the chance of being poor. Large household sizes, despite having more labour, may not be 
as efficient given the highly seasonal nature of agricultural activities and the shortage of 
off-farm employment opportunities in remote areas. In addition, the use of labour in rural 
households may be sub-optimal due to the difficulty of expanding the production scale by 
investing in new technologies or purchasing more land (e.g., poor households often lack 
sufficient capital for big investments while trading land is not a common practice in rural 
Vietnam). 
Land  and  physical  capital  have  strong  and  significant  influences  on  the 
probability of being poor for households that are under all three poverty lines. However, 
the magnitude of physical capital is greater than that of production land, suggesting that 
having more land can be efficient in escaping extreme poverty but investing in physical 
capital is a better way to go above the higher-level poverty lines.  
Other household characteristics such as education of labour, age and sex of 
household  heads,  and  the  exposure  to  shocks  have  expected  influences  on  poverty 
reduction. The log of labour education suggested that households with a more educated 
labour  force,  ceteris  paribus,  can  have  a  lower  probability  of  being  poor  but  this 
relationship was only significant at the national and PWR measures. The log of age of 
household heads suggests that households have less chance of being poor if they were 
headed by more mature persons but the significance was only at the PWR poverty line. 
The dummy variable for female-headed households also shows the expected positive sign 
for  all  three  poverty  measures  as  they  are  often  disadvantage  households.  The  shock 
dummy variable has a positive sign, although not significant, in all three measures of 
poverty. It is possible that shocks encountered by households surveyed, on average, are 
not big enough to create significant influences. 
The Battese (1997)’s dummy variables for households with no dependent and 
no land suggested that these households have less chance of being poor under PWR and 
the international poverty line (it was dropped under the national poverty line because of 
perfect multi-colinearity). Despite the international poverty line being too high for many 
poor households to achieve, the significant lower probability of being poor under this line 
for households with no land may be possible. The reason for such a belief is that most of   36 
the households with no productive land were involved in off-farm activities, which often 
generate  much  higher  income  than  agricultural  production.  The  dummy  for  non-
participating households (i.e., duration is zero) suggest that they have a higher probability 
of being poor under international rather than the local poverty measures. However, this 
variable did not provide much intuitive interpretation since it is the average of the three 
groups that have not participated in microfinance programs. 
 
5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This  paper  has  presented  the  analysis  of  the  effects  of  microfinance  on 
household welfare. An analytical framework was introduced to identify main factors that 
may  influence  microfinance  effectiveness.  Although  there  are  still  several  ways  to 
analyse microfinance effects, we choose the regression approach because it suited the 
time  and  resources  and  information  available  in  this  study.  Particularly,  we  focus  on 
analysing  effects  of  microfinance  to  the  household  income  and  consumption.  The 
analysis  was  conducted  using  a  quasi-experimental  survey,  which  aims  to  compare 
welfare of microfinance members with that of households of similar characteristics. The 
endogeneity test suggested that our quasi-experiment survey have made the access to 
microfinance exogenous, and hence, standard regression techniques can be applied. The 
generalised  Hausman  test,  however,  showed  that  the  order  in  which  eligible  villages 
received  microfinance  may  not  be  random,  thus,  a  village  fixed-effect  model  was 
preferable as it can provide consistent estimates regardless the order of receiving services. 
The contribution of microfinance to household welfare was very modest. For 
example,  a  one  percent  increase  in  the  duration  of  microfinance  membership,  ceteris 
paribus,  leads  to  only  0.19  percent  increase  in  income  and  0.07  percent  increase  in 
consumption per adult equivalent. Perhaps, the small proportion of microfinance loans, 
compared  with  the  total  loans  and  total  income  of  households,  has  constrained  its 
contribution. A closer examination at main consumption items revealed that access to 
microfinance  services  has  made  the  spending  on  education,  food,  and  entertainment 
increase whilst payment for medications and doctors decreased.   37 
There  is  also  evidence  that  participating  in  microfinance  has  significantly 
contributed to the reduction of poverty using the national standard, which is about US 20 
cents  per  person  per  day.  However,  a  possible  interpretation  that  poverty  incidence 
increases with the duration of microfinance when the international poverty line is used 
although  this  finding  is  not  statistically  significant.  One  possible  explanation  for  this 
behaviour was due to the modest contribution of microfinance to household income, it 
could not lift them over the international poverty line but it could be sufficient to help 
them get over the level of poverty under the national standard. 
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